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ince at least the time of Descartes, one of the most impor
tant issues facing Western philosophers has been the
relationship between the internal world of individual
human consciousness and the external world of physical
objects. Some thinkers, most notably Berkeley and Hegel, sought
to resolve the issue by altogether denying the existence of an
objective world beyond sense perception. Others, such as W. V.
Quine, have gone to the opposite extreme by denying the exis
tence of consciousness, mental substances, or anything else
which could be said to exist apart from the physical world,l All of
these views share in common the idea that some kind of polarity
allegedly exists between the external and the internal, such that
one is inexorably occasioned by, or derived from, the other,
I have argued elsewhere that an examination of the ax
ioms of formal logic, rather than of the nature or structul'e of
consciousness, may provide a clue as to the ontological status of
physical objects. 2 In what follows, I hope to draw upon and
improve this idea in an effort to provide a deductive proof for the
existence of physical objects apart from cognition, In so doing,
my chief goal is to establish a prima facie distinction between the
existence of physical objects and the cognitive realization of those
objects as such. I shall not attempt to deal with broader issues
pertaining to the ontological status of consciousness, cOgnition,
and the like.

S

I. Strong Idealism Defined

Unlike their ancient and medieval forbearers, the philosophers of
the Enlightenment were especially fascinated by the vagaries of
sense perception. By shifting the focus of philosophy from reason
to perceived experience, Locke, Berkeley, Hurne, and their ilk
radically challenged the longstanding Aristotelian correspon
dence theory of knowledge and its accompanying metaphysical
doctrines. More importantly, they called into question the very
intelligibility of a "real world" which can be said to exist inde
pendently of knowing, experiencing subjects. In an orderly,
piecemeal succession, the empiricists divested epistemology of
its old tokens, starting with Locke's doubting of substantial
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qualities and ending with Bume's rejection of substance and
mind.
Although Burne is not an idealist in the strict sense, he
nonetheless provides a very good example of the kind of thinking
1 wish to criticize in this paper. Bume begins his Treatise of
Human Nature with a detailed consideration of the origin of ideas.
All perceptions, he says, can be divided into ideas and impres
sions. The latter are those perceptions which enter with most
force and violence/' including physical sensations, desires, emo
tions, etc. (1:1:1). The former, in contrast, are "faint images" of
impressions which emerge in the course of thinking and dis
course. According to Bume, all thoughts and ideas ultimately
come from impressions. We could not have ideas for things for
which we have no impressions whatsoever (1:1:1).
All ideas of the mind seem to be interconnected by some
universal set of principles (1:1:4). The first of these, which Bume
terms resemblance, refers to the way in which particular ideas or
impressions are said to be similar to other ideas or impressions.
The second, contiguihj, refers to the way in which particular ideas
or impressions are ordered in time and space. The third, cause and
effect, refers to the way in which certain ideas 01' impressions
cause or bring about other ideas or impressions. The first two
principles pertain to relations belween ideas and can be divided
into qualities such as identity, quality, etc. (1:1:5). Cause and
effect, in contrast pertains to all contingent matters of fact about
the world (1:3:2).
Cause and effect, again, refers to relationships in which
particular ideas or impressions seem to cause or occasion other
ideas or impressions. Hume argues that empirical observation,
rather than a priori reasoning, leads us to posit cause and effect:
"Though the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects canies
its view beyond those objects, which it sees or remembers, it must
never lose sight of them entirely, nor reason merely upon its own
ideas..." (1:3:4). The observation of causal relationships between
impressions forms the basis of human experience as well as all
reasoning about matters of fact (1:3:4-5).
Given that resemblance, contiguity, and causation are the
only ties that unite our ideas together in consciousness, how are
we to discern between true beliefs about matters of fact and
fictitious beliefs? In the first place, Burne says, a belief is not the
same thing as a simple idea. Rather, belief is a particular manner
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of forming an idea" which convinces the mind of some thing's
existence (1:3:7). The idea, moreover, is always formed according
to relational and/ or causal relationships between present impres
sions or impressions given to us in the past (1:3:8). To put it
another \\'ay, the mind forms beliefs according to the resem
blance, contiguity, or causal connections which subsist among
particular impressions and ideas. In cases of demonstration, truth
is established precisely because falsity is unintelligible. But in
cases of matters of fact, true belief is established to the extent that
such a belief corresponds to present impressions, impressions
given in the past, or an agglomeration of both. Thus for Hume, all
human knowledge reduces to ideas; we can have no knowledge
of substance.
This account of knowledge differs from that of Locke and
Berkeley in a number of important ways, a few of which are
certainly worth noting. For Locke, the mind can only form simple
ideas from the primary substantial qualities of objects of experi
ence, e.g., extension, numbers, the power to produce secondary
qualities in minds, etc. (II:2). Locke takes for granted that minds
exist and that these minds form ideas from the primary qualities
of objects of experience. It follows, then, that we can know
something of the substance - that is, the world outside our minds
- but only through its power to produce ideas within us. For
Berkeley, in contrast, we cannot even know the primary qualities
of substances (1:9-10). All we know are the ideas given to the
mind. It is impossible to know whether these ideas correspond to
some substance separate from our own minds. Hume goes one
step further then both Locke and Berkeley by suggesting that all
knowledge reduces to ideas formed from impressions. We cannot
even assume a "mind" to which ideas are given, for the idea of
mind is not formed from present or past impressions.
For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to the afore
mentioned notion that all knowledge of existing things reduces
to ideas as strong idealism. Some philosophers, including Kant,
have attempted to refute strong idealism by suggesting that an
external world must exist in order for our ideas to exist, even if
the exact nature of this world remains eternally beyond our
grasp.3 More recently, certain analytic philosophers have gone in
the opposite direction by suggesting that ideas, and all attendant
notions of mind, consciousness, and the like, are somehow re
ducible to physical or materialistic processes, thereby inverting
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the nature of the problem entirely. For such philosophers, the
question is how to account for the existence of the internal
world," and not vice versa. I make no attempt here to deal with
either of these solutions. Rather, I want to suggest an alternate
way to account for the existence of an external world beyond
cognition or sense experience by examining the idea of logically
necessary truth.
IF

II. Necessary Truth and the Existence of Physical Objects
All relevant epistemological issues aside, it is generally accepted
that certain truths of formal logic or mathematics, such as
"2+2=4," are necessary, such that their denial implies a kind of
unintelligible contradiction. To put it another way, we cannot
intelligibly imagine a state of affairs in which a necessary state
ment such as "2+2=4" could be false, provided that the terms in
question are adequately defined. At the same time" however we
can intelligibly imagine a universe which is like ours in all
respects except that it does not contain any human (or, for that
matter" rational) beings. The question then becomes: do logically
necessary truths obtain in such a universe?
In one sense, this seems impossible, inasmuch as it is
impossible to imagine any possible world in which the denial of
"2+2=4/1 is true. But it is also clear that the very concepts
(quanlitative and otherwise) that are presupposed by this state
ment are unintelligible in the absence of rational minds to con
ceive them. This latter point has led some philosophers to con
clude that the whole notion of necessary truth is in some sense
absurd. J. S. Mill, for instance, argues that the JI character of
necessity ascribed to truths of mathematics, and even... the pecu
liar certainty attributed to them" is an illusion [because] those
h'uths relate to, and express the properties of, purely imaginary
objects" (19). Similarly, A. J. Ayer points out that the reason
necessary h'uths are necessary is that "we cannot abandon them
without sinning against the rules which govern the use of lan
guage, and so make our utterances self-stultifying" (33). But
language is, of course, something which is inconceivable without
the existence of beings who use language. In this sense, logically
necessary truths are only necessary within a decidedly contin
gent context - namely, a context in which rational beings exist.
Assuming that the latter point is true, i.e., that the exis
tence of rational beings is contingent, it follows that the existence
l
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of any rational being X at time T is purely potential - that is, it
mayor may not be the case that X exists at time T. Assuming
further that the aforementioned truths of logic are ontologically
dependent on the existence of some rational being X, it follows
that these truths mayor may not obtain at time T, depending on
whether X happens to exist at T. From these assumptions, it
would seem to follow that in a universe such that X does not exist
at time T, no logically necessary truths obtain at time T.
Even if \ve grant that the instantiation of logically neces
sary truths is ontolOgie ally dependent on the existence of some
rational being X, it does not necessarily follow that there is a
possible rational being X such that the existence of X could instan
tiate a different or even contradictory set of logically necessary
truths. In fact, it seems impossible to imagine a rational being X
such that the existence of X instantiates a "truth" of the form
"2+2=5./1 Even in a state of pure potentiality, logically necessary
truths seem binding on all possible rational beings. To this extent,
logically necessary truths remain necessary for all possible be
ings, whether or not such beings ever happen to actually exist at
all.
This idea implies, among other things, that the truth
value of certain logical axioms or propositions remains indepen
dent of the actual cognition of some rational being X. In other
words, certain axioms or propositions remain necessarily true
even if the instantiation of these axioms or propositions by some
rational being X is contingent. If this is the case, it follows that the
truth value of logically necessary axioms or propositions is in
some sense independent of the ontolOgical status of rational
beings, possible or actual. They remain constant even in a uni
verse in which rational beings happen not to exist.
Taken at face value, this view carries a number of difficul
ties. It seems absurd, for example, to suggest that 1/2+2==4" is a
true proposition in a universe with no rational beings to instanti
ate notions of quantity. Notice, however, that the very construc
tion of these arguments necessarily implies that our universe is
such that at least one rational being exists (namely, the author).
And while it is certainly true that the rational being in question
just happens to exist (that is, exists contingently), the fact remains
that he does actually exist, which means that the aforementioned
logically necessary truths obtain.
Let us assume for a moment that the external world, and
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all physical objects that are part of the external world, do not exist
apart from the cognition of some rational being X (a position
which is roughly synonymous with "strong idealism"). Most of
the aforementioned logically necessary truths, especially those
pertaining to mathematics, implicitly rely upon a principle of
quantification, which in tum relies upon principles of identity
through which physical objects are differentiated. If physical
objects do not exist, then it makes no sense to speak of
"identities" and, by extension, It quantities." Thus the very idea of
a statement such as 1/2+2=4/1 becomes, in some sense, unintelligi
ble.
As we have already seen, however, it is impossible for
any possible rational being to come into existence and not to
instantiate the aforementioned logically necessary truths. If this
is the case, it follows that whenever some rational being X comes
into existence at time T, it not only instantiates certain logically
necessary truths, but also all the necessary preconditions in
volved with the instantiation of these truths. Inasmuch as the
actual existence of physical objects is a precondition of the instan
tiation of at least some of these truths (viz., the laws of mathemat
ics), it follows that the actual existence of some rational being X at
time T necessitates the existence of physical objects. And inas
much as at least one rational being actually exists (viz., the
author), it follows that physical objects also exist.
It may be objected that the actual existence of physical
objects beyond the cognition of some rational being X is not
necessary for the instantiation of relevant logically necessary
truths. Quantity, for instance, may be derived from "ideas" of
physical objects alone, whether or not these ideas correspond to
some reality outside of the cOgnition of some rational being X.
My reply is twofold. First, on what basis can quantity be derived
if ideas alone exist? On a partially materialist view, quantity can
be derived from physical differences - that is, we can decide that
there are two things rather than one if the things in question meet
certain physical criteria (e.g., the atoms of which they are con
structed are at a certain spatio-temporal distance from each other,
the atoms have differing chemical make-ups, etc.). On what
grounds can we possibly say of two ideas that they are distinct
without positing the existence of some kind of super-ideal sub
stance?
Second, the existence of ideas must come either from
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some reality outside the cognition of some rational being X, or
else from other ideas already present to that same being. If the
latter is true, then the ideas in question must themselves come
from other ideas, or else they must come from at least one innate
idea. The former is not plausible because it leads to an endless
causal chain of ideas. The latter, in contrast, needs to be ac
counted for according to a principle of sufficient reason. Such an
idea, even if innate, must come from somewhere apart from
itself. Clearly it cannot come from another idea, since it is the first
idea, which means either it comes from an external world apart
from cognition or else was "implanted" by some other force.
The question then becomes what this "other force" might
be. If it is not part of an external world outside of cognition, then
it must be some kind of "superphysical/l or supernatural force.
We then must decide whether the alleged existence of such a
supernatural force" carries more evidentiary weight than the
alleged existence of an external, phYSical world. The principle of
parsimony (or Ockham's razor, if you prefer) allows us to elimi
nate this hypothesis. There is no need to posit the existence of a
supernatural force when we Call just as easily account for the
existence of ideas with reference to an external world which
exists apart from the cognition of some rational being X.
The point is that quantity, among other things, logically
entails the existence of physical objects, such that qUalltity cannot
obtain apart from the existence of physical objects. Even in a
world in which some rational being X happens not to exist, there
is no state of affairs such that X could come into existence without
the concomitant existence of physical objects, for these are neces
sitated by the concomitant instantiation of logically necessary
truths. The preceding proof can be expressed in the following
syllogistic form:
PI: If some rational being X exists at time T, then all
logically necessary truths are instantiated;
P2: The instantiation of some logically necessary h'uths is
ontologically dependent on the existence of physical ob
jects apart from the cognition of some rational being X.
P3: No physical objects exist apart from the cognition of
some rational being X.
P4: Some rational being X exists at time T.
el: Therefore, only logically necessary truths that are not
ontologically dependent on the existence of physical ob
II
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jects apart from the cognition of some rational being X are
instantiated at time T.
C2: But this is absurd (from PI and P2).
C3: Therefore, P3 is false.
C4: Therefore, some physical objects exist apart from the
cognition of some rational being X at time T.
In the foregoing proof, only a few of the premises are truly
controversiaL P1 seems irreproachable because its negation
would entail the denial of at least some logically necessary truths,
which is impossible. P2, however, depends on the aforemen
tioned idea that certain logically necessary truths, such as the
laws of mathematics, require the existence of physical objects to
be intelligible. I have already addressed one possible objection to
this premise; are there any others? It seems that one could deny
that concepts such as quantity are ontologically dependent upon
the existence of physical objects, but it is unclear exactly how this
would be the case. Quantity presupposes the existence of two Xs,
where X is a physical object of some kind or else an idea derived
from a physical object.
The only other option is to deny the existence of cogni
tion, in which case all physical objects exist apart from the
cognition of some agent X. This option takes us beyond the
purview of metaphysics and into the philosophy of mind; as such
I make no attempt to deal with it here. The proof is not intended
to demonstrate that all existence is reducible to physical phenom
ena, but rather to refute the strong idealist position by demon
strating that at least some things exist apart fmm the cognition of
some rational being X. The question of whether cognition exists
at all as a separate, non-physical phenomenon is left open. I
should point out, however, that the general foundation of this
proof, as well as its conclusions, seem perfectly compatible with
a strong materialist view of mind and substance.
III. Conclusion
In sum, although the instantiation of logically necessary truths is
ontologlcally dependent upon the existence of some rational
being X, their necessity is such that they could not be otherwise
for any possible rational being X. This implies that the actual
existence of any rational being X at time T brings with it the
instantiation of logically necessary truths, as well as any and all
preconditions which this instantiation requires. I have argued

38

NATHANJ. JUN

that the actual existence of physical objects is a precondition to
the instantiation of at least some of these truths. Whether or not
cognition stands in any real relationship to physical objects re
mains an open question. But in the meantime, the existence of
logically necessary laws provides sufficient grounds for conclud
ing that at least some physical objects exist apart from the cogni
tion of rational beings.
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NOTES
I Cf., e.g., W. V. Quine. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New
York: Random House, 1966; Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Quine is obviously only
one of many modem philosophers who endorse this sort of thesis.
Others worth mentioning include Gilbert Ryle, John Searle, Paul and
Patricia Churchland, etc.
2 Nathan Jun. "Truth, Language, and Derridean Skepticism." Nexus: A
Forum for Ideas, Vol. 3,3-8.
3 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason. Paul Guyer,
trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
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